is impossible to make hard and fast statements about the apparently unlimited number of encyclopedic associations of every lexical item (Drescher & Homstein, 1976) . To this we add that some linguists have contended that there exists a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that define every item; this conception has provided the rationale for the study of lexical fields. ' Those linguists who argüe for an encyclopedic conception of semantics tend to see concepts as fuzzy and open-ended; for them categorization, which shows prototype effects, is preferably carried out on an experiential basis. Those who argüe for the restrícted view, see concepts as well-defined discrete entities within a system. In this paper we take sides with the non-restríctive view, but with two essential differences. We see the use of words as the key indicator to encyclopedic semantics, and we do conceive of words as entering into systemic relations with other words, but not in terms of lexical fíelds in the traditional structuralist sense. In fact, we will contend, it is relational systems that give US the key to both knowledge and lexical organization, at least to the extent that these two run parallel or are co-dependent. Haiman (1980) and Langacker (1987), among others, have made a convincing case about the necessity of an encyclopedic conception of semantics. Haiman shows that the difference between dictionaries and encyclopedias is simply artificial and argües for a denotative view of knowledge. Langacker sees the encyclopedic nature of linguistic meaning as a function of the encyclopedic nature of contextual meaning. For him, the speaker, in forming a conventionalized notion, abstracts away from many specific events whose knowledge structure is fairly elabórate. It is inevitable that we use all this knowledge whenever required for interpretation. Imagine, for example, that the sentence The cat is on the mat became conventionalized to describe the moment when a wrestler defeats a tiger by pinning its shoulders to the floor of the ring. The conventionalized expression would be related to an schematic conception of tiger-pinning, an event which would invoke a large number of other knowledge domains (wrestlers, wild felines, shows, etc.). Later, Langacker attempts to deal with the problems of the open-endedness and the accessibility of encyclopedic knowledge. He answers in terms of centrality and network orga-nization (see also Langacker, 1990: 266ff) . First, he claims, not all facets of our knowledge have equal status, and semantic specifications form a gradation, some being central and some perípheral. Centrality correlates with the extent to which a specification is conventional, generic, intñnsic, and characteristic: non-conventional specifications can be conventionalized over time; generic specifications (eg. our knowledge that cats chase mice) are more central than non-generic ones (eg. the knowledge that my neighbour is allergic to my cat); a property is intrinsic if it makes no reference to extemal entities (eg. shape for physical objects, in contrast to size which involves comparison with other objects or a scale of measurement); fínally a specification is characteristic to the extent that it is unique to the class designated by an expression (again, shape is more characteristic of the class of cats than colour).
A NETWORK CONCEPTION OF ENCYCLOPEDIC SEMANTICS
Second, Langacker suggests that linguistic expressions are not containers for meaning.* Not everything that I know about cats is invoked when I hear the word cat. Concepts are simply «entrenched cognitive routines» which are «in-terrelated in various ways facilitating their coactivation [...] but nevertheless retain enough autonomy that the execution of one does not necessarily entail the activation of all the rest» (Langacker, 1987: 162) . In this vein, Langacker sees the entity designated by a symbolic unit as a point of access to a network, and its semantic valué as the set of relations in which this access node participates. This conception would allow us to explain, for example, how we can relate cat and cheese without postulating that the concept of 'cheese' figures directly in that of 'cat': we attribute to cats the property of chasing mice, and to mice the property of eating cheese. ' Langacker makes no specific proposal as to what a relational network should look like; ñor does he discuss the number and kind of relations in a net-work (his 'cognitive routínes'). In other words, his explanation lacks the notion of system. Someone might say that the notíon is not necessaiy, but then a relatíonal network would simply be a highly idiosyncratic, random set of associatíons, which would be against the principie of economy in at least to ways: first, it would be highly variable, which would hinder conununication; second, it would not allow to abstract away predetermined pattems of association which are essential for some conceptual operations like those based on analogy, operations which are relevant for understanding language.' But before we deal with the number and nature of network relations in encyclopedic semantics, we need to enquire into the nature of the access nodes. These need to fulfil the requirements of centrality specifíed by Langacker (being conventional, generic, intrinsic and characteristic). Then we shall contend that the prototypical structure of these nodes and the more marginal features are accessed relationally.
CONCEPTUAL SCHEMAS
Lack of space will prevent us from giving but a sketchy account of interna! conceptual structure. We shall start by discussing the notion of 'cognitive model' proposed by Lakoff (1987ab,1989 . We shall see the connection between this notion and Langacker's observations as set out above. Lakoff bases his proposal on previous empirícal research by cognitive psychologists on prototype effects (Rosch, 1978) . These are «scalar goodness-of-example judgements for categoríes» (Lakoff 1987a: 63), which have commonly been taken as indicators of conceptual structure or as representations. Against this view, Lakoff argües that prototype effects do not result from a prototypical arrangement of Information in our minds, but from other sources. He identifíes five, which he calis 'idealized cognitive models': earlier frame or schema theories (these are 'propositional models'), image-schemas, metaphor, metonymy, and symbolic models (that is, direct form-meaning pairings).
Lakoff does not seem to define the concept of idealized cognitive model. However, from his treatment of the subject one may assume that it is a conventionalized pattem of belief or of communication used in understanding.
This wide-ranging defínitíon enables us to put together, as Lakoff does, what we can cali operational models like metaphor and metonymy, which are dynamic, with non-operational models like image-schemas, mental frames, and symbolic models, which are statíc. Another difference must be noted between the models listed by Lakoff: while image-schemas are fairly abstract knowledge constructs, like oríentatíons, paths, containers, forcé, part-whole relationships, etc. (see Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1989 Lakoff, ,1993 , the other models seem to be more concrete. This would lead us to distinguish between abstract and non-abstract cognitive models, an idea which will not be pursued here but which may find enough support in Lakoff and Tumer's (1989) treatment of proverbs as generíc structures and in Tumer and Fauconnier's proposal of generíc mental spaces (see Fauconnier & Tumer, 1994; Tumer & Fauconnier, 1995) . Now, both operational and abstract models are based on the description of non-operational propositional models (frames or similar structures): thus, the source and target domains of a metaphor (traditional vehicle and tenor) are propositional models; the same applies to metonymy'' and to generic mappings (like proverbs*); then, image-schemas can be enriched by means of the associated non-abstract propositional elements.' For this reason, we need a thorough description of propositional models before we can deal with the others in greater detall. Our proposal will be based on the notion of conceptual schema.
We shall defíne a conceptual schema as a knowledge construct which consista of a set of general defíning conditions (or definers) which are varíously instantiated from individual to individual and from occasion to occasion depending on the contingencies of its use. Whereas the defíning conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for the item to be such, the instantiations are subject to prototypicality degrees. These prototypical associations can be ' Take a metonymy in which the wwd bread stands for the idea of nourishment, as in Peace will not give bread to the people. In otder to be able to explote all the implications of this metonymy we need to have access to the information that bread is a basic kind of food, that it is cheap and can be obtained easily, and the associated idea that bread is the last thing a person would like to be deprived of; taking away the bread from people is a denounceatde practice.
' Take Lakoff and Tumer's (1989) example Blind blames the ditch, where the blind person represents any person who, when faced with a difficulty he cannot cope with (the ditch), blames the dífficulty lather than his own incapacity .
' A path-schema may illustrate this point. If I say l'm ahead ofJohn on my way to prontotion, I am talking about a situation in which John and I are moving along a path towards a destination (the promotion). The destination is the goal, and the movement means progress to achieve the goal. This is a fairly abstract characterization, but now compare l'm miles ahead of John on the rocky road to promotion, which is a ptopositionally enriched versión of the former and requires, for interpretation, an exploration of the propositional model for the word road. expressed in propositíonal terms, and, as will be shown below, constitute the basis for reasoning processes -like those studied by modem pragmatics-and explain prototypicality ratíngs. Moreover, the associatíons share a regular number of relatíonal propertíes, to such an extent that it is possible to say that it is these properties that genuinely provide the basis for pragmatic reasoning in a cognitively económica! way. It will be noted that whereas this proposal follows and elabórales on Langacker's view of encyclopedic knowledge, it runs partially counter to Lakoff s theory of cognitive models as the source of prototype effects. I see no problem in deriving prototype effects from what I have called operational models, like metaphor and metonymy. Indeed this m u ^ r be the case if the models represent mental operations. But it is not possible to say that a non-operational model -that is, a static cognitive representation-produces any effects. It is the actual instantiation process of prototypical associatíons -which, incidentally, is a mental operation-that does the deed.
In order to illustrate my view, let us take Lakoff s discussion of the concept of 'mother', which he treats as a cluster of cognitive models (Lakoff, IQSTaióTff).'" Lakoff postulates an advantage of models over feature theoríes in that the former have an intemal structure which features do not have. According to the classical theory of categorízation it is possible to find a set of clear necessary-and sufñcient conditions for 'mother' that will account for any use of the concept. It might be something like: a mother is a woman who has given birth to a child. But this condition does not cover the full range of cases. It is just one model -the birth model (cf. the expressions biological mother, surrogate mother)-which is accompanied by other models: the genetic model (cf. donor mother), the nurturance model {cf. foster mother, adoptive mother), the marital model (cf. stepmother) or the genealógica! model (the closest female ancestor is the mother). All these individual models converge to form a cluster but when they diverge for cultural development reasons, people tend to view one as the most important (nowadays, the birth or nurturance models are usually more prominent). Lakoff (1987a: 69) points out that different models are used as the basis of extended senses of mother, as in the metaphor Necessity is the mother ofinvention (birth model), or in the den ved verb in He wants his girlfriend to mother him (nurturance model). Of course, the ideal model for mother is where all the other models converge.
Plausible though Lakoff s view seems at first sight, there are some fundamental problems with it. One is the lack of a system which regulates the con- vergence of the different models of a concept. Another is that -contrary to his assumptíon-it is possible to state a set of necessary and sufñcient conditions for the concept of 'mother', and in fact for most other concepts of our expcríence. This does not preclude postulating the existence of prototypical information in a concept and of prototype effects. A woman is a mother so long as she has (or has had) at least one child. It does not matter whether she has borne her own offspring, whether she feeds and cares for them, or whether she is married. We can only understand the concept of mother in relation to the concept of child, whatever the cognitive model that is brought to bear." So, 'mother' and 'child' are mutually interdependent concepts and each of them becomes a 'necessary-and sufñcient' condition for the other. In our own account, 'mother' invokes a schema with a general definer (ie. 'woman who has (had) (at least) a child'), which can be instantiated in different ways as needed. Consider the foUowing utterances:
(1) My mother is in her menopause (2) ?My mother has just shaved her beard (3) My sister has had nine babies and is expecting her tenth (4) A good mother will suckle her baby (5) Mary is a mother without children (6) She's always concemed about her children (7) She's not my real mother because she adopted me (8) My mother got divorced fhjm my father (9) ?My mother got divorced from my únele (10) A mother will always love her children (11) ?A mother will always hate her children As a female person (a woman), a mother shares all the attributes of a person and a female, which renders (1) consistent, but not (2). Now consider what having children involves: children, as any human being, are bom (henee, example (3)), and nurtured (examples (4), (6), (10), but note the inconsistency in (11)). A mother is usually married to a male person who acts as the father, which explains utterance (8). However, note that not any male person will do: an únele is the brother of one of a child's parents, and one's mother cannot be married to him -in our monogamous society-as long as she is still married " Even the raantal model («the wife of the father is the mother») abides by this requirement. We cannot speak of father and mother (ie. parents) without children. Otherwise the marital relationship is simply one of husband and wife.
to the child's father. That is why utterance (9) is strange. Finally, consider example (5). This is not a counterexample -despite appearances-to our general defíner. It is a sentence that demands special interpretative procedures: in OFder to give the sentence an interpretation we need to look for at least one of the stereotypical attríbutes of mother and apply them to «Mary» (perhaps she behaves like a mother with most children but does not have any of her own; this is Lakoff s nurturance model). In fact sentence (S) is proof that we cannot have a real mother without children, but we can find a woman who shares other attríbutes with mothers and cali her mother by extensión.
From the foregoing discussion we see that a conceptual schema consists of a set of necessary-and-suffícient conditions, plus their related prototypical associations.'^ This is the prototypical core of the schema. Prototypicality is a matter of degree, which means that some conceptual associations are more central to the concept than others. As conceptual associations become more and more perípheral, the user fínds it increasingly diffícult to make the connection with the concept. This bears not only on prototypicality judgements, as found by Rosch and her co-workers, but also on coherence phenomena, as we shall show below.
Lct US illustrate this point. Think of a party. You would expect a party to be defíned as a hosted social gatheríng where the participants (the guests) expect to have fun by taking part in any of a number of merry-making activities. These specifications constitute the defíners for 'party'.'^ Thus, a party cannot be a party if there is only one person -«xcept perhaps in the strange case of an individual acting out different roles and pretending to be different people-, or if there is not some form of intended merry-making activity, or if there is not a host (it might be the case that we fínd a number of people who meet together by chance and decide to have fun by singing, dancing, telling jokes and so on; in this case each of the participants is self-invited and belongs in the party as long as he or she is accepted by the others). '^ If, for example, one thinks of pos-'^ Cf. Upka(1992:118), where he argües infavoiirofanintegrationoffeaturesemantics and prototype semantics, a proposal that most proponents of either theory would flatly reject. Lipka points out that prototype theory cannot account for abstract concepts, connotative features, deictics, relational words and syntagmatic relations, but that it is paiticularly suited for the descríption of concrete extralinguistic objects. The leader will be able to see that our descriptive model is able to deal with all these aspects of meaning. To this, we add the possibility of explaining reasoning processes and coherence phenomena.
" Still since any event takes place in a certain location and time, these would be more general defining parameters which are prototypically instantiated (eg. in the evening, in a room).
'* There are many other forms of merry-making social events, like going to the theatre, a football match, or a ball. There is only one single activity associated as a necessaiy-and-sufficienl sible instantiatíons for the merry making definer, one may come up with such prototypical possibilitics as games, dancing, music, people performing tricks, and otfaer forms of entertainment. However, would you expect to find a nüns-trel or a jester? These concepts have a merry-making connection with the party schema, but it is only a feeble one, since they invoke a medieval context, which is strange to our present knowledge about parties. They are part of the periphery of the schema.
Another characterístic of conceptual schemas is that they are always basic-level categoríes, that is, categories which are in the middle of the conceptual hicrarchy." Superordinate and subordínate concepts are treated as depending on the basic-level term. We cannot understand concepts such as 'parent', 'animal', 'event', and other general ones unless we abstract away from a number of instances, like 'dog', 'cat', 'horse', etc., for 'animal', or 'mother' and 'father' for 'parent', or 'party', 'death', 'accident' for 'event'. In the same way, a 'poodle' as a type of dog, a 'Siamese' as a type of cat, and a 'stallion' as a type of horse share most of their features with the basic category except for a few which become specially relevant when the specific category rather than the basic-level one is invoked.
It must be noted that our treatment of conceptual schemas as a formalization of encyclopedic knowledge stands up to the requirements of centrality and accessibility postulated by Langacker. A semantic specification in terms of defíners and prototypical instantiations is conventional, generic, intrinsic and characterístic. At the same time, it only requires the activation of selected knowledge items as needed by the ongoing cognitive activity (eg. language use). Now, we want to note one further virtue of the account: economy of activation. This is achieved because the instantiation process is regulated by means of relational ares which allow the user to explore the intemal nature of the concept or to relate it to other concepts on an extemal basis. Relational activity also accounts for what is usually called the periphery of a concept.
condition with each of these events: the perfomiance of plays, two teams contending under certain rules, and dancing, respectively. But we typically have more; for example, a number of short skits for the theatre, a cheerleader show for a football match, or hired entertainers for a ball.
" Basic-level concepts were discovered by Brent Beriin, Eleanor Rosch and her co-woriters. They found that the most cognitively basic concepts, like those designated by cat, chair, car, are not like logical primitives, but have a rich intemal structure. Among a large number of other properties, the basic level is the level at which most of our knowledge is oiganized, and thetefore at which subjects are fastest at identifying entities that belong with the concept (see Lakoff, 1989: 106-108; Taylor, 1989: 46-51, for further discussion).
RELATIONAL ARCS
There is one basic qualitatíve difference between the concepts of 'mother' and 'party'. The fonner is non-complex; the latter is complex. Relatíonal systems only work with non-complex basic-level concepts. Complex concepts enter lelational networks only as composites of non-complex basic-level concepts. Consider again the case of 'party'. As a complex concept we can say that it consists of a number of social (Interactive) activities (handshakes, hugs, kisses, singing, dancing, etc.) and a number of entities related to the activities (tables, chairs, snacks, drínks, the host and guests, etc.). This constellation of elements provides the first level of instantiation of the schema defíners. Once a basic-level element is instantiated, it becomes a potential candidate for further levéis of conceptual activation, a process which we can cali -when it takes place-schema extensión, and which leads interaally -through recurring activations-into increasingly peñpheral levéis of the concept or extemally into other sepárate concepts. Thus, relatíonal ares can be either intemal or extemal to a conceptual schema. We shall distinguish tentatívely the following relatío-nal types:
INTERNAL RELA'HONS
We study intemal relations in terms of actíons, processes, positions and States:'* -Actíons: Actíons are states of affairs where a certain entíty performs some kind of actívity which is under its control. The actívitíes involved have some sort of effect on other entítíes. We distínguish five relatíons under this relatíonal type:
Agentive: an entity performs a controUed actívity which is typically associated with it: a judge decides cases in a law court, a carpenter works the wood, a sportsman dees sports, a cat chases mice, a murderer kills people, an ass brays, etc. One basic form of linguistic realization of this semantic relation is does/is done by. Factítive-an entity performs a controUed actívity which is typically associated with it and as a result of the actívity another entity comes into existence: a shoemaker malees shoes, a builder builds houses. a baker makes bread, a cabinet-maker makes fumiture, a musician composes music, etc. One basic form of linguistíc realization of the factítive relation is makes/is made by.
Purposive-agentive and factitíve relatíons between enüües are sometímes conceived as mediated by an instrument^ ''f ^y,./" example. a carpenter works the wood with a number of tools (hke a hammer, a saw, pliers, and so on), a baker uses an oven to make bread etc We can also relate the instrument with tíie action: a hammer is us^ for hittíng, a saw is used for cuttíng. a stove is used for cooking. an oven is used for baking (eg. bread), etc. One basic form of realizatíon for this relatíon is is usedfor/is performed by means of.
Causatíve: here either an entity or an event is responsible for the coming about of an event. For example. a hurricane causes destruction a mosquito-bite gives you an itch. a heart attack may cause death, heat causes iron to expand. etc. One basic form of reahzation is causes/is caused by .
^ " j Resultatíve: here an entity is the necessary result of a controUed activitv We can set this in contrast to what happens in facüüve relatíons. where entítíes are not tíie necessary result ofan actmty. Thus. ash necessarily results from buming some matenal (eg. wood. paper), but shoes do not necessarily result from the actívity of a shoemaker. In this case, one basic form of rcalizatíon is produces/is produced by.
Proccsscs'
Processes are dynamic statcs of affairs where the actívity performed by an entity is beyond its control. We distinguish two relaüons:
Processual: when an entity is typically or necessaiily seen as involved in a certain actívity over which it has no control For «'«««pie a nver flows people Uve. Ughtning happens durmg thunderstorms, the Earth revolves;SindüieSun.etc.Onebasicformofrealization,sá<,«.
Oriírinatory: when a certain entity bccomes another related entity with some distinguishing features. this relation is appUed to such i««. as Svater, seed/plant, gr^pe juiceAvine, boy/man. gu;l/woman. cuMion. etc. As a basic form of lealization we have originates w/,s converted mto.
¡¡Sri non-dynamic states of affairs controUed by one of the partí-cipant entítíes. There is only one relation:
Positioner: an entity is related to another entity and it is up to one of the two entitíes to decide whether the relation holds. For example, a mother has children, a rich man has ríches, a husband has a wife, etc. The basic form of realization here is has/is had by.
-States: A State is a non-dynamic state of affairs where no participant entity has any control over it. We distinguish the foUowing relations:
Material: an entity is described as being the material of which another entity is typically made: table/wood, tyre/rubber, statue/stone, tombstone/marijle, etc. A basic form of realization is is made of/is the material of.
Container: an entity is seen as three-dimensional and described as either typically or necessaríly holding another entity in its interior: sea/water, bottle/wine, vein/blood, etc. A basic form of realization is contains/is contained by.
Partitive: this is a very productive relation in English; here an entity is described as consisting of other entities, some of which are necessary conditions for the entity to be such: head, limbs, and trunk/body, board and legs/table, barrel, hammer, and trigger/pistol. A basic form of realization is is a parí of/consists of.
Locative: an entity is typically associated with a certain location: game/woods, ghost/castle, kangaroo/Australia, tiger/jungle, sheep/ fold, etc. A basic form of realization is is found in/ is the place for a.
Attributive: an entity is either necessarily or typically ascribed a certain property: rubber/elastic, rock/hard, rope/Iong, tree/tall, mountain/high, etc. A basic form of realization is the attributive use of is for adjectives, and I'Í a property of fot nouns.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS"
Only intemal relations respond to the typology of states of affairs in terms of the features described above. Externa! relations allow us to look at any concept in terms of other concepts which are not part of its intemal make-up. The-i^fore thesc relatíons are not defining in any sense. Rather they are a mmitZ¡on7^Z.r.l intellectual operations that we are able to perfonn on conTepU One of this operatíons is paradigmatic; the others are syntagrr>auc.
Paradigmatic:
-Classifving-an entíty is seen as belonging to a hierarchy of hyperordinates"^! entiwwiirshare ¡orr^e of its less idiosyncratic attributes w.th its hyof dog' and the different breeds (poodle. greyhound, ^^J^^^^^j^y^^f¿^ Pekinese. buUdog. boxer, foxterrier, pointer. beagle. setter, etc). A basic form of realizaüon is is a type of/is classified into.
Syntagmatic:
üesbutoftheirdiffere"ces,whichb««m^lcvanao^ For two concepts to be contrasted *«y "J^^'^f J°,üons. IHus. we find refercr,ce in terms of *e ^'^^^^l^'^^l^^osrñc^, masüff/poodle. that contrasts hke arm/leg, ^^^'"^^^^^^^^ \ i, ^ore difficult and even head/trunk, rootA,ranch, -^:^^^^^¡"^^^l '¿ble/floor. among others. pointless to contrast nosc/limestone, tlngc^/socRc^ A basic form of realization is ^^^X^Z incompatible with another con--Opposing: when one concept« ^°^J~ J^ ^ not belong to the cept with which it shares a number f/"^J,"¿'^i f^J^"^^^^ ^lations. we same domain of -f^"-^^^^^^l^'^SS kill/resurrect. say both concepts are «PP?^^^?»'o^wa' of realizing this relation is the exconstruct/destroy, love/hate, etc . une way pression is the opposite of.
. hnuher or John is neither rich ñor poor, in contrast to '« Statements like / neither lave ñor note ne • ^ ^^^ ^^ sometimes there is some *John is neither dead ñor aUve. which is ir^^ ^^ -^ ^^^ ^^ ^^p^^^ ÜH^se cases of use that we middle ground between two opposing concep . ^^^j^jj^,"ji"ess (terms which are used by structalk of incompatíbility rather than =°"'''™:"'"^^ concepts are incompatible to the extent that they turalists like Lyons, 1977, and Leech, iv» j^ ^ ^^^^. ^^,^".^ paribus. if you are cannot stand together as the statement of one wouio canee -^Analogising: this relatíon holds when a concept is seen as sharíng some noteworthy characterístic with another concept, usually in terms of the other relatíons. For example, take the analogy heart/pump: the heart circuíales blood through the body, in much the same way as a pump circulates liquid (or gas, or air) through another system. The purposive relation (the purpose of the heart shares some features with the purpose of a pump) makes it reasonable for us to refer to the heart as a pump and to say that the heart pumps blood through the body. Or take the analogy foot/hoof. A foot is to a man's leg what a hoof is, say, to a horse's leg; they share a functional and a physical similarity (they serve to stand on, walk, run, etc., and they are found at the end of the leg). It is the partitive relationship that is in volved here." One basic form of realization of this externa! relation is is analogous to.
COGNinVE DOMAINS AND COHERENCE
A network of intemal relations constitutes the cognitive domain of a concept These help to define the concept in prototypical terms as they instantiate the general defíners, which provide not only the necessary and suffícient Information to define the concept non prototypically, but also a coherent and well-arranged specification for the instantiation process to take place in an orderly manner. On the other hand, extemal relatíons permit the introduction of semantically related terms into a given schema; they are also helpful in providing expressive altematives to avoid repetition of a term for a concept (eg. The brats stoned the cat, and the poor animal died); they are also of use to provide US with points of connection between different concepts. The activation of intemal and extemal relational ares generates sets of propositions which are the basis for reasoning and inference pattems.
To give some illustration of the power of a relational account, consider how coherence relationships are established in the foUowing text on the basis of conceptual associations: rích you cannot be poor; if your are young, you cannot be oíd, if you are destroying you are not constnicting. Of course, two incompatible concepts can sometiraes be put together if they are applied to different aspects of a state of affairs; for example, one can be too young for some actívities and too oíd for others.
" To the extent that some analogy relations are innovative or non-conventional we will not include them in our account. However, it must be noted that many analogies are conventionat and have become pan of our way of organising our conceptual systems. For example, one prototypical property of honey (being sweet and tasty and therefore likeable) has become associated with the idea that there is something about some girls that make them desirable, as evidenced by expressions like What a honey she is!. Also, analogy lies at the base of conceptual metaphor.
THE SIMPSON TRIAL
The prosecution continued to present testimony from pólice ofñcers descríbing what they discovered at the muider scene and at O. J. Simpson's mansión. As expected, the defence launched an aggressive crossexamination, seeking to portray the investigation as inept and carelcss. The proccedings ended the week with the prosecution's introduction of the famous glove and cap found at the murder scene. (Time, February  27, 1995, pp. 7-8) .
We shall take the definer for 'trial' to be the following: A social event where a judge (or a jury) decides whether a person (the defendant) is guilty of a crine by considering whether there is enough valid evidence against him.
As a social event a trial consists of a number of activities performed by a number of participants^ that takes place at a certain place and time (the courtroom during working hours). But, in principie, this locative instantiation is not to be necessarily performed by the language user for the interpretation of this text, neither as an explicature or as an implicature.^' In a trial a judge (or a jury) judges on the grounds of valid evidence. This part of the intemal stnicture of the defíner is essential for the coherent interpretation of the text we are discussing. The task of the prosecution and of the defence (agentive ares) is to present valid evidence, the former against, the latter in favour of the defendant. Consequently we understand that what the pólice discovered is brought forth by the prosecution against Simpson. Since some valid evidence can be produced by questioning witnesses (resultative are), we assume that the pólice officers" were questioned by the prosecution and also by the defence. The defence cross-examined the same witnesses. Cross-examination is a form of questioning (classifying are), with the purpose (purposive are) of finding contradictions bctween witnesses; if carried out by the defence, we conclude that cross-examination is in favour of the defendant, which is confirmed by the text (inept and careless Information is invalid evidence). There is an agentive connection between 'investigation' and 'pólice officers', on the one hand, and an identifying relation between 'investigation' and the fíndings achieved by the of- (classifying) ; therefore, the murderer could have wom the glove and cap found at the murder scene. But this provides no connection with the rest of the text unless we infer (by implicature) that what is being suggested is that the glove and cap might have belonged to Simpson (positioner are), and that that is why the prosecution introduced them as evidence against him.
CONCLUSIÓN
The fact that the rích interna! structure of a conceptual schema contains a core of instantíated prototypical elements explains why it ís possible to statecontrary to Lakoffs assumptíons-that we have mental representatíons in the foim of prototypes, and that one source of prototype effects is found in instantíatíon processes -which are an intellectual activity-. Also, the existence of this prototypical core is not incompatible with a general semantíc specification in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. In fact, these provide the basis for orderly conceptual actívatíon through instantiatíon (that is, for the construction of a network) and for the association of peripheral elements with a conceptual schema through core-compatible extensión processes. Finally, we have seen how relational systems regúlate instantiatíon, some coherence phenomena, and inferential pattems. In general, our discussion on conceptual schemas argües strongly for the possibility of formalizing a large pan -if not all-of our encyclopedic knowledge and, as a result, for the inclusión of encyclopedic semantics in linguistic theory. 
